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1. INTRODUCTION
With a very narrow opinion in Ross v. Bank of America, the Second
Circuit has opened a new door in the ongoing narrative surrounding
mandatory arbitration and class action waivers in consumer
agreements.2 While the Second Circuit's decision merely determined that the
plaintiffs had stated a sufficient harm to gain standing and then remanded the
case for decision on further standing issues, it did so only after making a
subtle, but important, distinction between harms caused by enforcing waiver
agreements and harms caused by the existence of widespread waiver
agreements. 3
Until recently, the focus of the class action waiver debate has been
whether such waivers, when combined with mandatory arbitration clauses,
are either unconscionable or illegal in consumer contracts. 4 Although
upholding class action waivers arguably shields businesses from frivolous
litigation, the enforcement of the waivers effectively bars individuals from
recourse in consumer disputes because the cost of arbitration would most
likely outweigh any potential damages. 5 The Ross holding establishes that
damages may be recoverable, in an antitrust context, to consumers regardless
of whether waivers are ever enforced.6
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Including a class action waiver in a mandatory arbitration clause has
become standard practice for many service contracts, including credit card
agreements. 7 With the majority of federal and state courts permitting and
even encouraging mandatory arbitration clauses, the validity of including
1 Ross v. Bank of America, 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008).
2 See Jean Sternlight, Ross v. Bank of America: Important Victory for Consumers
Subject to Arbitration Provisions, http://www.indisputably.org/?paged=6 (last visited
May 13, 2009). (The full article is only available on cached pages. A copy of the full
article is on-file with the author).
3 See generally Ross, 524 F.3d. at 217.
4 See Byron Rice, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 Hous. L. REv. 215, 226-58
(2008).
5 Id. at 247-48.
6 Ross, 524 F.3d at 223-25.
7 Rice, supra note 4, at 224.
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class action waivers has become an important issue in consumer
litigation. 8 Federal Circuits are unevenly split on whether to uphold the
combination of class action waivers and mandatory arbitration
clauses. 9 Specifically, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits have found that compulsory class action waivers are legal;
the First and Ninth Circuits have found them to be illegal or
unenforceable.10
Significant class action waiver decisions have been structured on several
different legal premises, including economic or judicial efficiency, freedom
to contract, unconscionability, and substantive right restriction. I I Circuits
which have upheld waivers have substantially relied on the Supreme Courts'
acknowledgement that a plaintiff's substantive due process rights do not
include a right to participate in a class action where other remedies are
available, such as arbitration on an individual basis. 12 These courts have also
upheld waiver clauses on principles of contract law. 13 Specifically, under a
freedom to contract theory, where consumers are not "forced" into signing a
waiver, companies should be permitted to contractually protect themselves
from frivolous litigation which is much less frequent when individually
pursued. 14
Courts which have determined that class action waivers, coupled with
mandatory arbitration clauses, are not enforceable have based their holdings
on arguments of unconscionability and restriction of substantive rights. 15 The
Ninth Circuit determined that class action waivers may be unconscionable
where they result in customers bearing greater costs "than those a
complainant would bear if he or she would file the same complaint in
court." 16 Additionally, the First Circuit declared that the substantive
implications of forbidding a procedural mechanism, such as a class action,
may be such that enforcing them abrogates consumers' substantive
8 Id. at 224-25.
9 Id. at 226.
10 Id.
I I Id. at 246-52.
12 See Randall Quarles, Courts Disagree: Is Arbitration A "Class" Act?, 68 ALA.
LAW. 476, 476-77 (2007).
13 See Rice, supra note 4, at 248-50.
14Id.
15 Id. at 251-52.
16 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003).
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rights. 17 The Ross -decision is significant because it relies on none of the
above legal premises, but instead details a different legal premise. 18
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2005, cardholders of various banks19 filed a class action lawsuit in the
Southern District of New York alleging that the banks violated antitrust laws
by collectively forcing cardholders to accept mandatory arbitration clauses
containing class action waivers as part of their cardholder agreements. 20 The
cardholders made two antitrust claims against the banks.21 First, the
cardholders alleged an illegal conspiracy to "impose mandatory arbitration
clauses" in violation of the Sherman Act.22 Second, the cardholders alleged
an illegal group boycott by the banks of customers who refused to agree to
the arbitration clauses. 23 Specifically, the cardholders' claim alleged that the
collusion of the banks to impose mandatory arbitration along with class
action waivers has resulted in three harms: (1) banks have been able to
"immunize themselves from economic responsibility for antitrust and
17 See Quarles, supra note 12, at 477.
18 See generally Ross v. Bank of America, 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008).
19 Id. at 219-20. Defendant banks include: Bank of America, N.A. (USA); Capital
One Bank; Capital One F.S.B.; J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; Chase Bank USA, N.A.;
Citigroup, Inc.; Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.; Citibank USA, N.A.; Citicorp Diners
Club Inc.; Universal Bank, N.A.; Universal Financial Corp.; Novus Credit Services, Inc.;
Discover Financial Services, Inc.; Discover Bank; HSBC Finance Corporation; HSBC
Bank Nevada, N.A.; MBNA America Bank, N.A.; MBNA American Bank (Delaware),
N.A.; Providian Financial Corporation, Providian National Bank, Inc. (American Express
Travel Related Services Company is part of the litigation only as an interested party). Id.
at 217-19. As a side note:
Defendants-Appellees Discover Financial Services, LLC, Novus Credit
Services Inc., and Discover Bank ("the Discover Appellees") proceed separately;
they contend that their cardholder agreements do not contain mandatory arbitration
clauses and class action prohibitions. Rather, Discover and Novus cardholders are
given a window during which they can opt out of mandatory arbitration. However,
the Discover Appellees join the other banks in arguing that the cardholders lack
Article III standing, the principal issue in this appeal. For the purpose of the standing
question, then, we consider Defendants-Appellees collectively.
Id. at 220.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 221.
22 Ross, 524 F.3d at 221.
23 Id.
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consumer protection violations"; (2) the cost and risk of antitrust non-
compliance has been shifted to cardholders by substantially increasing any
dispute resolution costs to individual cardholders; and (3) the absence of non-
arbitration credit cards in the market has diminished the overall quality and
value of credit card services offered to consumers. 24 The cardholders sought
an injunction to prevent the banks from future collusion in regard to
arbitration clauses, invalidation of all existing arbitration agreements, and
dismissal of all currently pending bank-sponsored litigation against
cardholders. 25
A year later, the district court dismissed the complaint stating that the
cardholders' injuries were "entirely speculative and, therefore, insufficient to
establish Article III standing" under the Constitution to seek judicial
recourse. 26 The district court found the injuries to be "entirely speculative"
because the cardholders' alleged harms were all contingent upon occurrence
of future misconduct by the banks.27 The court reasoned that because no
misconduct requiring arbitration had occurred, the arbitration clause had not
been invoked or enforced, and thus, the cardholders' alleged harms had also
not yet occurred.28 The cardholders appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals contesting that mandatory arbitration clauses in credit card
contracts, when a product of illegal collusion, do constitute Article III "injury
in fact" and thus standing should be granted.29
IV. HOLDING AND REASONING
A. Threshold Requirement: Injury in Fact
Article III of the United States Constitution only extends power to the
judiciary to decide "actual cases and controversies" and does not extend
power to decide hypothetical questions of law. 30 Thus, in order to have
standing to bring a claim authorized by the Constitution, a plaintiff must have
an "injury in fact" that is related to the challenged action and redressable by a
2 4 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. Additionally, a plaintiff must have antitrust standing. Paycom Billing Servs.,
Inc. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 290-92 (2d Cir. 2006). However, a court only
analyzes antitrust standing after Article III standing has been established. See, e.g.,
Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 714-16 (7th Cir. 2006).
27 Ross, 524 F.3d at 221.
28 Id. at 222.
29 d.
30 Id. at 223.
[Vol. 24:2 2009]
ROSS V. BANK OF AMERICA
judicial decision.31 This threshold for standing, however, is not a high one-
"injury in fact" may consist of a nominal harm or even a plaintiffs fear of
future harm. 32
B. Legal Analysis: Reduced Choice and Services are Injury in Fact
The circuit court espoused that the cardholders' claims represented a
subtle variation from the typical, more common class action arbitration
clause arguments because the cardholders were not challenging the validity
of the arbitration and class action provisions in their credit agreements.
Rather, the cardholders were bringing an antitrust violation claim against the
means used by the banks in establishing mass arbitration agreements. 33 The
circuit court pointed out that, contrary to the finding of the district court, the
dormancy or enforcement of the arbitration clauses was not relevant to the
analysis of the cardholders' alleged damages.34 The circuit court then
explained that the cardholders' alleged harms are injuries to the market and
not injuries to any individual cardholder from the possible invocation of an
arbitration clause.35
According to the circuit court, antitrust injury need only consist of
restriction to consumers from making "free choices between market
alternatives." 36 The cardholders' claim asserts that as a result of illegal
collusion and group boycott, consumers have been "deprived of any
meaningful choice on a critical term and condition of their general purpose
card accounts" and that this reduces consumer choice and diminishes the
quality of credit services available to consumers in general. 37
Additionally, the circuit court addressed two specific arguments of the
banks: (1) reduced consumer choice merely represents harm to a "subjective
31 Id.
32 Id. at 223. Article III standing is not the same as antitrust standing. An injury
which results in antitrust standing requires (1) that violation of antitrust laws caused or
threatened to cause the plaintiff injury in fact; (2) that the injury is not too remote or
duplicative; (3) that the injury is the kind of injury that antitrust laws were intended to
prevent; and (4) that the damages claimed or awarded are reasonable and
quantifiable. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof'l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 66
(2d Cir. 1988).
33 Ross, 524 F.3d at 223.
34 Id. The district court stated that because the banks did not invoke the arbitration
clauses in the present dispute, "they are dormant contract provisions incapable of creating
the requisite Article III injury-in-fact." Id.
35 Id. at 224.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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preference"; and (2) antitrust laws only protect consumer choice where there
is an ascertainable economic impact on the market.38 The circuit court stated
that the cardholders' claim presents two objective harms to consumer
choice.39 First, the bank collusion to mandate arbitration clauses containing
class action waivers effectively excludes consumers from any class action
lawsuits. Thus cardholders are forced to "expend time and legal fees to
monitor the legality of the banks' behavior, whereas if the cardholders had
access to a card that permitted class actions, they would have the option of
relying on motivated class action attorneys to perform this function." 40 A
card with a mandatory arbitration clause and class action waiver is therefore,
less valuable than a card without such provisions. 41 Second, the court
explained that the present value of cards containing both mandatory
arbitration and class action waivers is also diminished because a "card that
limits the holder to arbitration is less valuable (all other factors being equal)
than a card that offers the holder a choice between court action or
arbitration." 42
The circuit court further stated that the banks' argument that the
cardholders do not have an actionable harm under antitrust law is misplaced
because Article III standing is distinct from antitrust standing.43 Antitrust
standing requires a "detailed and focused inquiry into a plaintiffs antitrust
claims," whereas Article III standing merely requires that plaintiffs allege a
harm or fear of future harm connected to defendants' challenged conduct and
that these harms can be redressed through judicial action.44 Accordingly, the
circuit court found that plaintiffs' harm met the standard of harm for Article
38 Ross, 524 F.3d at 224.
3 9 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 224.
42 Id. The court explained that:
The cost of litigating the antitrust issue when the particular dispute arises will
almost certainly be disproportionate to the dispute. (A plaintiff will not spend a
hundred thousand dollars in legal fees to litigate a five thousand dollar dispute.).
Furthermore, the cardholders' ability to prove the illegal collusion may well have
evaporated with the passage of time, due to the deaths, retirements, changes of jobs,
and fading memories of the participants and observers of the conspiratorial
meetings, as well as the loss and destruction of documents.
Id.
43 Ross, 524 F.3d at 224-25.
44 Id. at 225.
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III standing and thus plaintiffs presented an actionable harm.45 The court did
not address whether plaintiffs would in fact meet requirements for antitrust
standing,46 or the other two prongs of Article III standing (causation and
redressability) because they were not addressed in the district court's
opinion.47
Additionally, the court addressed one further issue regarding the doctrine
of prudential ripeness. 48 The defendant banks contended that the cardholders'
claim was not ripe for adjudication "because the cardholders are not faced
with a sufficiently imminent threat of injury, and, as a prudential matter, their
antitrust claims would better be entertained at a later time." 49 The court
stated that the purpose of requiring a dispute to be ripe before adjudication is
to prevent courts from becoming "entangled" in speculative or hypothetical
disputes. 50 Thus, for the same reasons that the cardholders' claims were
sufficiently imminent to constitute Article III injury in fact, they avoid the
pitfalls associated with "unripe" disagreements. 51 Therefore, the court
deemed the cardholders' claims ripe for adjudication. 52
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT
The Ross v. Bank of America decision is potentially very important to
consumers pursuing class actions. 53 Because the plaintiffs in Ross sought
45 Id.
4 6 Id. at 225.
47 Id. The court specifically addressed Discover's contention that its credit
agreements do not mandate arbitration and impose a class action waiver by stating:
The Discover Appellees urge us to affirm the district court's judgment as to the
cardholders' claims against them, arguing that because their cardholder agreements
allow individuals to opt out of mandatory arbitration, they do not cause any antitrust
injuries. Because the district court disposed of all of the cardholders' claims on
standing grounds, it did not examine the specific ramifications of the Discover
Appellees' cardholder agreements. We remand Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims against
the Discover Appellees to afford the district court the opportunity, in the first
instance, to examine the opt-out provisions and to determine whether the Discover
Appellees should be treated differently from the other banks.
Id.
48 Ross, 524 F.3d at 225-26.
49 Id.
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relief under antitrust and RICO statutes, on remand the court must examine
the nature of the plaintiffs' alleged harms as to how they affect the overall
market and not from the viewpoint of unconscionability or denial of
substantive rights.54 The Ross decision provides courts with a new
foundation upon which to structure class action waiver analysis and one that
proves to be favorable to consumers if they are able to bring a legitimate
antitrust claim.55
The decision potentially also has far-reaching implications in terms of
the scope of damages available to plaintiffs. 56 As Professor Sternlight
comments:
Where, as plaintiffs allege in Ross, essentially an entire industry (such
as the credit card industry) has chosen to impose individual binding
arbitration on its customers, the Ross decision offers the possibility that
companies who allegedly conspired to limit consumers' dispute resolution
choices can be held culpable civilly or criminally for violating antitrust
laws. As antitrust law makes available not only injunctive relief but also
treble damages, and attorney fees, it may be a powerful tool for reining in
industries intent on limiting consumers' procedural options. Potentially such
antitrust suits can be brought in other industries, such as securities, nursing
home, cell phones, or auto dealerships, where the allegation has been made
that it is difficult or impossible for consumers to secure a particular good or
service without giving up the opportunity to resolve future disputes in court
and through class actions, rather than through individual arbitrations. 57
Accordingly, the Ross decision may not only open up the door for more
future court decisions striking down class action waivers, but it also opens
the door to diverse remedies for plaintiffs. 58
Erin Holmes
54 See Stemlight, supra note 2.
551d.
5 6 1d.
5 7 Id.
5 8 Id.
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